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THE JUDICIAL PROCESS REVISITED:
INTRODUCTION
ARTHUR L, CORBINt
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals,
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, author of the four lectures en-
titled The Nature of the Judicial Process that were delivered at Yale, was a
man of such beauty of countenance, such personal charm, and such keenness of
mind, that to write of him now creates again the poignant joy that he brought
to his friends and listeners at Yale more than forty years ago. His smile could
melt one's heart to tears, his modesty and quickness of understanding roused
instant confidence, and the beauty of his language, written and spoken, made
it the perfect expression of his thought.
One Cardozo on a judicial bench was enough to give assurance that it would
be the dispenser of justice that satisfies the imagination and fulfills the hope.
In the judicial conferences after the final argument, without the slightest
assumption of superiority or universal wisdom, he added an element so
persuasive that he was seldom on the dissenting side. Decisions were not
always unanimous, for judges could not always see with Cardozo's luminous
eyes; they might be wedded to the rule of thumb, the worded doctrine of a
book, the doctrine carefully written down from an old professor's lecture, the
conviction that the taught rule is eternal and must not be weakened into
variation and uncertainty. The mind and spirit of Cardozo were free; and yet
he had ample respect for stated rules and doctrines. He had no illusion of all-
wisdom; and he paid just tribute to the opinions of the judges with whom he
sat.
In 1921, at the invitation of the Association of American Law Schools,
Cardozo came to Chicago to address its annual meeting in support of the
proposal then before it to organize what became in the following year the
American Law Institute. In a charming address, leavened with wit and
permeated with good humor, fit to associate with his many more profession-
al lectures, filling just four pages in the Annual Report for 1921, he dis-
claimed any special wisdom, saying,
I have no message to deliver, no counsel to offer, nothing except my own
sympathy and interest in the project, a conviction that there is something
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to be done and a willingness within the narrow limits of my capacity to
cooperate in the task of doing it.'
With keen accuracy, he proceeded to state the function of the judge and its
limitations and to suggest the possible part to be played by an Academy or
Institute. Above all, he said, a function of the Institute would be that of
cooperation.
We are to substitute for the attitude of mind, the temper, that spends
itself in hostility and distrust, the attitude and temper of mutual help-
fulness, of willing cooperation, a fusion of diverse types and capacities and
attainments. Of course, in such a process there are losses as well as gains.
Sometimes one has to scrap the things that one would like to keep. One's
pet hobbies are sometimes derided, and one's dearest formulas rejected.
One who sits in an Appellate Court, with the necessity of convincing or
placating six minds or more, becomes finally more or less inured to these
scenes of carnage and mutilation. But in exchange one gains other things
that mitigate the sacrifice.2
At the end he received what the Report describes as "tumultuous applause."
This address to the collection of law professors in 1921 occurred soon
after the publication of his lectures on The Nature of the Judicial Process,
and more than a year after he personally delivered those lectures at Yale.
More than any living man, except Judge Thomas W. Swan, the writer of this
contribution had an active part in the preliminaries to the delivery of those
lectures. I had been attracted by Cardozo's opinions as a member of the New
York Court of Appeals, and I had published a detailed critique of his opinion
in DeCicco v. Schweizer,3 a critique that expressed enthusiastic admiration
and yet had some differences in analysis. That led to some correspondence at
the time and to our sending to him a complimentary subscription to the Yale
Law Journal, a gift that brought back an appreciative letter to the editors of
the Journal.
In 1918, our faculty had the perennial problem of inducing a competent
and attractive man to deliver the Storrs Lectures. Some of Cardozo's prede-
cessors in that course had been both competent and attractive; but not all of
them had a style or a delivery that would hold an audience of students. Thus,
in 1903, Sir Frederick Pollock delivered here his lectures poetically entitled
"Our Lady of the Common Law," lectures that are attractive in both sub-
stance and form. All the faculty and all the students attended his first lecture.
It was my first year as an instructor; and the name of Sir Frederick excited
my imagination and aroused great expectations. I listened carefully but I
could understand next to nothing. Sir Frederick peered with near-sighted
1. Address of Judge Cardozo, in HANDBOOK OF THE Ass'N OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL MEETING 117 (1921).
2. Id. at 120.
3. 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917). See Corbin, Does a Pre-Existing Duty Defeat
Consideration?-Recent Noteworthy Decisions, 27 YALE L.J. 362 (1918).
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eyes close to the manuscript and spoke indistinctly through his beard, with
an accent and pronunciation that has been described as "cockney." Five years
later, I reported this fact to a distant cousin in London who was then registered
in the Inner Temple and who later became the Vice-Chancellor of Brazenose
College and a writer on International Law. This young man's fashion of
speech was so like my own that I marveled at this in the light of my ex-
perience with Sir Frederick. With a young law student's promptness and as-
surance, he replied: "Oh, Sir Frederick could never make a living practicing
law here in London." At his subsequent lectures, he had practically no audience
except the members of the faculty who had invited him. Sir Frederick ap-
peared to be not in the least disturbed by this.
Although none of us had ever seen Judge Cardozo, we enthusiastically
approved the invitation extended to him by Dean Swan. From New York,
we received an immediate reply. Cardozo wrote that he was surprised that
we thought him competent to deliver such a course, and that he felt quite
unable to accept, because (he wrote) "I have no message to deliver." But
he appreciated so greatly our thought of him that he wanted to call upon us
and make our acquaintance in New Haven. A day was set; and Cardozo met
us in the office of the Dean. The very sight of him told us that he was
our man. After introductions, we sat in a semi-circle about the Dean's desk.
Cardozo repeated what he had already written, especially his appreciation.
But he could not possibly accept, because "I have no message to deliver." At
that point, the suggestion was made as follows: "Judge Cardozo, could you
not explain to our students the process by which you arrive at the decision of
a case, with the sources to which you go for assistance?" With a bird-like
movement of the head, and a mere moment of hesitation, he replied: "I believe
I could do that." We had acquired our lecturer.
During the succeeding tvelve months, in the midst of his judicial labors,
he prepared his lectures entitled The Nature of the Judicial Process. He was
scheduled to deliver them on four successive days at 5 P.M. The first lecture
was given in a lecture hall accommodating some 250 listeners. As in the case
of Sir Frederick Pollock, every student and every faculty man was in the
room. Standing on the platform at the lectern, his mobile countenance, his
dark eyes, his white hair, and his brilliant smile, all well lighted before us,
he read the lecture, winding it up at 6 o'clock. He bowed and sat down. The
entire audience rose to their feet, with a burst of applause that would not
cease. Cardozo rose and bowed, with a smile at once pleased and deprecatory,
and again sat down. Not a man moved from his tracks; and the applause
increased. In a sort of confusion Cardozo saw that he must be the first to move.
He came down the steps and left, with the faculty, through a side door, with
the applause still in his ears.
The next day, each student must have brought a friend. The hall was
jammed, with many more pushing to get in; and we transferred the lecture
to the near-by Lampson Lyceum, with some 500 seats. For the remaining
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lectures that hall was filled to capacity; and each day at 6 P.M. the ritual of
the first day was exactly repeated-the rising of the audience, the continuous
applause, the smile of pleasure, the appreciative bow, and the leaving with the
faculty while all others stood and cheered. Both what he had said and his
manner of saying it had held us spell-bound on four successive days. He had
inspired our ambition in the law and had warmed the cockles of our hearts.
Never again have I had a like experience. To him also it must have brought
a glow of emotion that would long be repeated within, just as it is now
repeated for me when writing of it after forty years.
Grouped about him, at the end of his fourth lecture, we said we must have
his manuscript for publication by the Yale Press. In his smiling but depreca-
tory way, he said that he did not "dare to have it published." Half seriously,
he added: "If it were published, I would be impeached." There were smiles of
understanding, but not an ounce of seriousness; and of course he surrendered
the manuscript to us. Within twelve months after the publication of the neat
little booklet, the Yale Press sold 3,000 copies in New York alone, with the
other results that you know. Thereafter, with greater confidence, he delivered
other lectures at Yale, Columbia, and elsewhere.
As Vice-President of the American Law Institute, Cardozo participated in
many conferences on the Restatement. Some of his hopes may have been real-
ized in that process; but in others he must have been greatly disappointed.
Whatever were the "diverse types, capacities, and attainments" of the Reporters
and their Advisers, there was not enough competence in the nation for the reduc-
tion of such a mass of material into the form of accurate, well organized, clearly
expressed, and up-to-date generalizations. The name "Restatement," chosen for
the product, indicates that many may have had the false notion that the com-
mon law consisted of a number of permanent, absolute rules and principles,
and that the function of the Institute was to eliminate ambiguity and error
and to restore them to their pristine clarity and perfection. There are spots
in which the Reporter seems to have believed that the effects that "equity"
had had upon the "common law" were not within his province. Anyone
taking active part in the process who held such a view must have been
progressively disillusioned. Those not taking part who held such a view must
have been disappointed. Those who are now engaged, thirty years after, in
drafting a Revision are well aware that the Restatement did not arrive at
permanent perfection, much less start with it, although they are using it
of necessity as the base from which to take the next step toward the future.
This writer can bear witness to one instance of Cardozo's active cooperation.
I drafted Section 357, constructing a rule that even a plaintiff who was him-
self in major default may have a right to some degree of restitution. It cer-
tainly was not a Restatement of any generally recognized rule. I sent a copy of
this proposed section to Cardozo. He replied expressing his disapproval. In
self defense, I prepared an article for publication, stating the facts of many
cases with the actual decision made therein. That manuscript I sent to Cardozo.
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The result was that we reached agreement. He personally drafted Subsection
(2) of that Section, exactly as it now appears, while he gave assent to my
Subsections (1) and (3).
This is not the place for a critical review of the substance of The Nature
of the Judicial Process. No independent mind can accept 100 per cent of the
conclusions and reasoning of another man, even of such worshipful masters
as Cardozo and Holmes. The best one can do is to smite those who fail to
accept them by 95 per cent. It is my conviction that Cardozo's neat sub-
division of the judicial process into four named methods may mislead the
unwary into supposing that they are separated by division fences into four
compartments. They are merely four aspects of one method-the Cardozo
Method. Also, I regard as likely to be given undue importance his classification
of the cases into (1) those where "the law and its application are alike plain,"
(2) those in which the "rule of law is certain and the application alone
doubtful," and (3) the residue in which "a decision one way or the other,
will count for the future, will advance or retard, sometimes much sometimes
little, the development of the law."4
There are, indeed, great differences in degree; and differences in degree
become so great as to be described as differences in kind. But there is many a
case in which the judges on a single bench can not agree on the class in which
the case before them falls. Where are the cases in which the "rule of law is
certain" even before the court has determined its "application"? All "rules
of law" are aggregations of words, with fringes of uncertainty and variable
content. A word is not a "crystal" but the "skin of living [and variable]
thought."'r The same is true of any group of words, called a "rule" or "princi-
ple." No word has any meaning except as it has been used by men as the
"skin" of their varying thoughts in differing contexts. A "rule of law" has
no content divorced from its applications; it is by a series of more or less
analogous "applications" (decisions) that it is stated and revised and restated;
and every application to new facts adds to (or subtracts from) its content and,
soon or late, compels a new "Restatement" and a new "Revision." This is the
evolutionary process by which the growth of law occurs.
It was not merely the cases that obviously fall neatly into his class (3) that
caused Cardozo to be "oppressed and disheartened in [his] first days upon
the bench." The "ocean" upon which he "embarked" was "trackless." But
even though "the quest for it [certainty of rule] was futile," he found methods
of judicial operation that gave him comfort and confidence:
As the years have gone by, and I have reflected more and more upon
the nature of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the un-
certainty, because I have grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to
see that the process in its highest reaches [in all of its reaches] is not
discovery, but creation, and that the doubts and misgivings, the hopes and
4. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 164-65 (1921).
5. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (opinion of Holmes, J.).
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fears, are part of the travail of mind, the pangs of death and the pangs
of birth, in which principles that have served their day expire, and new
principles are born. 6
Cardozo's Chicago address to the law professors makes it easy to see why
they at once enrolled him as one of their judicial heroes, to the envy of some of
his judicial brethren. He acknowledged the necessary function of the re-
search scholar in the recognition, the restatement, and the growth of legal
principles. He spoke of the existing distrust of mere "theorists" and of "legal
theory," a distrust expressed by lawyers and judges, by "men who deal with
the law in action, the men in the thick of the fight." He felt free to speak
"with candor about this because I do not share the distrust myself." Who is
it that does not love "recognition"? The "distrust" that he did not share,
however, has ample and enduring justification. The progression of life causes
casualties among "legal theories" much more certainly and rapidly than among
judicial "decisions"; but these "theories" are those announced as reasons by
the judges as well as those advocated by the scholars. "Your decision will
probably be right but your reasons are certain to be wrong" was the advice
given by Lord Mansfield to a young jurist.
Cardozo's judicial method brought together all the possible sources of judi-
cial and societal wisdom and experience, awarding a high place to the full-time
research scholar. The chief defect in the rule of Erie v. Tompkins is in the
fact that it denies to diversity litigants the advantages of his judicial method
and does it on the false ground of Constitutional necessity. In diversity cases,
the federal courts are empowered by the people of the several states that have
adopted the Constitution to do justice between diversity litigants. They have
a right to the same wise and satisfying judicial process as other litigants. It is
the Erie v. Tompkins decision and not the Constitution that denies to them
the benefits of Cardozo's method. The Supreme Court itself can and does
abandon the strait-jacket that is pinned on the lower federal courts. It makes
federal general law that is "common" to all the states, using all of Cardozo's
sources. Inferior courts can do so only by subterfuge and in fear of reversal
for doing it.
Cardozo's method does not give first place to research scholars.
I do not say that in any disparagement of the Courts, their learning or
ability. I am not making any damaging admissions here in this con-
clave of our critics. I am standing up on my constitutional rights, and I
shall not add to the burdens of my tribe by any unnecessary confessions.
... In all this I am not attempting to depreciate the value of Judge-made
law or to exaggerate its defects. On the contrary, I am convinced that
it is the best and most flexible agency for development and growth. Just
because I believe that, I am anxious to place at the service of the Judges
the resources and the results of modern scholarship and learning.1
6. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166-67 (1921).
7. Address of Judge Cardozo, op. cit. supra note 1, at 118.
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Only the immature academic mind can fail to realize that the research
scholar's chief source of the materials on which his generalizations must be
based is the mountainous mass of court decisions and opinions. He must realize
also that his generalizations must be tested and altered and restated and
abandoned in accordance with their application (or rejection) by the courts
to the ever-changing problems of life. This is one main reason why Restate-
ments must be revised and restated; it is why the Revisions of the present
decade will show vast differences from the Restatements published 30 years
earlier; it is why the Revisions of the present era will require a new Revision
within another 30 years. There will be new classifications and more acute
analyses as well as new rules and explanations, although the basis of the new
Revision will be the still meritorious, though partly erroneous, patently in-
adequate, outgrown and inoperative, Restatement of the past.
